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This paper explores the role of learning in generative grammar, highlighting 
interactions between distributional patterns in the environment and the in-
nate structure of the language faculty. Reviewing three case studies, it is 
shown how learners use their language faculties to leverage the environ-
ment, making inferences from distributions to grammars that would not be 
licensed in the absence of a richly structured hypothesis space. 
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1. Introduction 
 
What does it mean to learn? Within the cognitive sciences, learning is treated as 
the creation of a system of mental representations in response to a collection of 
experiences (Chomsky 1975, Gallistel 1990). The learning organism’s task is to 
infer from data the system that produced that data. In the relatively simple case 
of learning a word, say ‘dog’, the learner’s job is to collect observations about the 
use of that word to infer what people in their speech community intend when 
they say ‘dog’. Learning has occurred when the learner knows what thoughts 
people are having (and intend him to have) when they say ‘dog’. We can tell 
what meaning the learner has acquired for that word on the basis of whether it 
judges new objects to be dogs or non-dogs. In general, the learning organism’s 
responses to new situations reveal the inferences made on the basis of experience. 
These inferences, in turn, reveal the properties of the mental representations that 
underlie learning and use.  
 The acquisition of syntax is parallel in this respect to the acquisition of 
words or any other cognitive structure. We assess the representations of the lear-
ner by examining how he responds to new sentences. Indeed, nearly every psy-
chologically oriented discussion of syntax begins with these two observations: (i) 
that we can produce and understand sentences we have never heard before, and 
(ii) that of the sentences we have never heard before, we can recognize that some 
are possible but others are not. Just as we can categorize animals we have never 
seen before as dogs or non-dogs, we can categorize strings of words we have 
never heard before as sentences or non-sentences.1 This ability implies a learner 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    1 There is no loss of generality if what the learner acquires is a system for assigning 
J. Lidz 
 
202	  
that responds to experience not simply by memorization, but by mapping 
experience onto representations that make predictions about what other 
sentences are possible and impossible.  
 The leading idea of Chomsky’s early discussions of learning (Chomsky 
1959, 1965, 1975; cf. Lees 1957: 406ff) is that the representations built by the 
language learner imply a non-obvious metric of similarity between the 
experienced sentences and the possible but as yet unencountered sentences. The 
dimensions we use to judge new sentences as possible or impossible appear to be 
highly abstract and removed from experience. Because these particular 
dimensions are not the only imaginable dimensions that the learner might have 
used to construct linguistic representations, Chomsky’s argument was that these 
dimensions (i.e. the dimensions of linguistic analysis) must be supplied not by 
experience, but by the innate endowment of the child.  
 Take, for example, the empty category principle (Chomsky 1981, 1986). If it 
is a true description of our knowledge of English syntax that non-pronominal 
empty categories must be properly governed, then the learning theory must 
supply the tools out of which this generalization can be identified or 
constructed.2 One of the primary sources of linguistic nativism is the observation 
that the explanatory pieces of linguistic representation (like proper government 
and the primitives out of which it is built, for example, c-command, theta-
marking, barrier, etc.) are in a vocabulary so far removed from experience that it 
becomes implausible that both this vocabulary and the complex relations built 
out of it are induced from experience. If it is further true that a generalization 
stated over this vocabulary (like the ECP) holds of the syntax of every language, 
then it becomes a reasonable hypothesis that this generalization reflects a 
universal feature of linguistic representation, a property that every language 
must exhibit as a consequence of biological design. 
 And here is the hypothesized connection between learning and universals. 
Because the universals reflect constraints on possible representations, learners 
simply do not consider representations outside of the space defined by these 
constraints. In the context of a learning theory, identifying the range and limits of 
possible languages is tantamount to identifying the immanent structure of the 
child’s language acquisition device. A single piece of explanatory machinery 
would account for both the range of possible linguistic variation and the 
language learner’s initial hypothesis space about what a language can be. 
 Critically, however, identifying the learner’s initial hypothesis space is not 
equivalent to providing a model of how the learner maps the input onto the 
appropriate representations (Fodor 1966, Pinker 1984). Such a model requires a 
procedure for mapping experience (as it is experienced by the learner) onto the 
representations that generated that experience, i.e. the grammar of the language. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
convergent derivations to strings of words, mappings from sound to meaning, or triples of 
sounds, meanings and derivations. The point is just that whatever system the learner 
acquires for representing the language must be such that it can deal with the unencountered 
sentences appropriately. 
    2 I take no stance on the status of the ECP in grammatical theory. The point is that if the 
theory posits some kind of grammatical knowledge, the learning theory must either be able 
to construct that knowledge out of some more basic primitives or else it is a primitive built 
into the learner directly. 
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This kind of learning model can be seen as a kind of analysis by synthesis, in 
which the language learner approximates the grammar that generated his 
experience (Halle & Stevens 1964, Townsend & Bever 2001).3  
 It is standardly held that having a highly restricted hypothesis space makes 
it possible for such a learning mechanism to successfully acquire a grammar that 
is compatible with the learner’s experience and that without such restrictions, 
learning would be impossible (Chomsky 1975, Pinker 1984, Jackendoff 2002). In 
many respects, however, it has remained a promissory note to show how having 
a well-defined initial hypothesis space makes grammar induction possible in a 
way that not having an initial hypothesis space does not (see Wexler 1990 and 
Hyams 1994 for highly relevant discussion). 
 The failure to cash in this promissory note has led, in my view, to broad 
skepticism outside of generative linguistics of the benefit of a constrained initial 
hypothesis space. Despite the fact that deep insights about the range and limits of 
syntactic variation have been achieved through the methods of comparative 
syntax (e.g., Kayne 2000, Richards 2001, Baker 2005, inter alia), researchers in adja-
cent areas of cognitive science have been less impressed with the idea that abs-
tracting out the universal formal properties of natural language from the study of 
individual grammars would lead to progress in explaining language acquisition.  
 This skepticism derives from several sources. First, it is not clear how these 
formal theories make contact with developmental data from children learning 
their first language. Second, the constantly growing sophistication of compu-
tational data-mining techniques seems to undercut the premise that the input 
does not contain the information relevant to building grammatical represen-
tations (Elman et al. 1996, Christiansen & Chater 1999, Klein & Manning 2004). 
Finally, a host of research showing that even young infants are sophisticated 
statistical learners seems to further raise the possibility that learners can extract 
more from the input that was assumed by standard arguments from the poverty 
of the stimulus (e.g., Saffran et al. 1996, Gomez & Gerken 2000) 
 Recent work in our laboratory is beginning to link formal theories of 
language universals with statistical approaches to language learning. This work 
explicitly examines the kinds of information that is available to a distributional 
learner and how this information is used in the course of language acquisition 
(Pearl 2007, Sneed 2007, Syrett 2007, Viau 2007, Pearl & Lidz 2009, Syrett & Lidz 
2009, Takahashi 2009, Viau & Lidz 2009,). Our hope is that this research will both 
remove skepticism of nativist approaches to language acquisition generally and, 
more positively, show how the inferences that learners make from input distri-
butions are constrained by antecedent knowledge of the universal features of 
linguistic representation and the range of possible linguistic variation. This pro-
gram aims to make good on the promise that a constrained hypothesis space 
helps learners to use the input effectively in acquiring a particular language. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    3 In the current paper, we emphasize the nature of the mapping between the input and the 
acquired grammar by considering the information that learners use and the conclusions that 
they can reasonable draw from that information. An important open issue in this context is 
the role of on-line parsing mechanisms in implementing these kinds of inferences in real 
time. See Baier & Lidz (2009) and Lidz et al. (2010) for discussion of the role of on-line 
algorithms in making inferences in acquisition. 
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2. Sensitivity to Input Distributions 
 
In the last 15 years, there has been a resurgence of interest in infants’ sensitivity 
to statistical features of the input language. A wide range of studies with infants, 
children and adults have demonstrated their ability to track statistical features of 
an artificial language and to use these features to learn generalizations about 
those grammars (for reviews, see Gomez & Gerken 2000 and Saffran 2003). How-
ever, it is important to emphasize that sensitivity to the statistical features of the 
exposure language leaves open the question of how this sensitivity contributes to 
the acquisition of a grammar. In every theory of language acquisition, the learner 
must be sensitive to features of the environment. The fundamental issue in the 
domain of distributional learning is what kind of learning mechanism this 
sensitivity feeds into.  
 In a learning framework in which the child brings the space of possible 
grammars to bear on the acquisition of a particular language, sensitivity to statis-
tical features of the environment functions as input to a selective learning mecha-
nism. Such a mechanism, restricted by the child’s innate endowment to represen-
ting only those relations that grammars can represent, provides an algorithm for 
selecting the appropriate representation of the input. Given linguistic experience 
plus the (probably infinite) set of possible grammars, the learning mechanism se-
lects that grammar which provides the best description of the input from within 
that space (see, e.g., Miller & Chomsky 1963, Fodor 1966, Yang 2002, and Pearl 
2007). 
 So, to best understand the role that the learner’s sensitivity to the environ-
ment plays in language acquisition, it is important to identify the deductive con-
sequences of this sensitivity. As noted in opening, we learn about the acquired 
representations by examining how the learner approaches new situations. Thus, 
by exploring the range of new situations that are taken by the child as compatible 
with their experience, we can infer something about the content of the acquired 
representations above and beyond the information contributed by experience. 
 
 
3. Deductive Consequences of Phrase Structure: Constraints on Movement 
 
Every syntactic theory recognizes that sentences in a human language are not 
simply linear strings of words. Rather, words in a sentence are arranged in 
nested hierarchical structures (Chomsky 1957, Jackendoff 1977). These structures 
make it possible, for example, to derive multiple interpretations from a single 
string. Consider the well-worn example:  
 
(1) ancient history teacher 
 
There are two possible meanings for this string. On one interpretation, this string 
refers to a very old person who teaches history. On the other, it refers to a teacher 
of ancient history. The ambiguity of the string supports the idea that a single 
string can be structured in multiple ways, as shown in (2). 
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(2) a. [ancient [history teacher]] 
 b. [[ancient history] teacher] 
 
 Constituent structure representations provide explanations for (at least) 
three kinds of facts. First, constituents provide the units of interpretation, as just 
seen. Second, the fact that each constituent comes from a category of similar 
constituents (e.g., NP, VP, etc.) makes it such that a single constituent type may 
be used multiple times within a sentence, as in (3): 
 
(3) [IP [NP the cat] [VP ate [NP the mouse]]] 
 
Third, constituents provide the targets for grammatical operations such as 
movement and deletion: 
 
(4) a. I miss [the mouse]i that the cat ate __i. 
 b. The cat ate the mouse before the dog did [VP eat the mouse]. 
 
 Thompson & Newport (2007) make a very interesting observation about 
phrase structure and its acquisition: Because the rules of grammar that delete and 
rearrange constituents make reference to structure, these rules leave a kind of 
statistical signature of the structure in the surface form of the language. The 
continued co-occurrence of certain categories and their consistent appearance 
and disappearance together ensures that the co-occurrence likelihood of elements 
from within a constituent is higher than the co-occurrence likelihood of elements 
from across constituent boundaries. 
 They go on to argue that this statistical footprint could be used by learners 
in the acquisition of phrase structure. And they show that adult learners are able 
to use this statistical footprint in assigning constituent structure to an artificial 
language. But again, showing that learners are sensitive to the statistical features 
of the environment does not yet provide information about the acquired 
representations. It is impressive that learners learned about the constituent 
structure of an artificial language given only statistical information about that 
structure. But this demonstration remains silent about the character of the 
acquired representations and the inferences that these representations license.  
 In order to determine whether the acquired representations have properties 
that derive from the structure of the learner, it is important to identify their de-
ductive consequences. Do learners know things about constituent structure (even 
if this structure is acquired using statistical features of the environment) that are 
not evident in the statistics themselves? 
 In order to answer this question, Eri Takahashi and I constructed a mini-
ature artificial grammar containing internally nested constituents. In addition, 
the grammar contained rules which allowed for the repetition of constituents of a 
certain type, the movement of certain constituents and substitution of certain 
constituents by pro-forms. We then created a corpus of sentences from this lang-
uage in which these rules applied often enough to provide statistical evidence for 
the constituent boundaries. In other words, the language provided statistical cues 
to the internal structure of the sentences. 
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 Our first question, using this artificial language, was whether adults and 
infants could acquire constituent structure using only statistical information. The 
language was presented in contexts that did not provide any referential 
information, so that no meaning could be assigned to any of the words. And, 
there was no prosodic or phonological information of any kind that could serve 
as a cue to the phrase structure. So, to the extent that learners could acquire the 
phrase structure, they would have to do so through the statistical features of the 
exposure. In order to test whether the learners acquired the phrase structure, we 
asked whether they could distinguish novel sentences containing either moved 
constituents or moved non-constituents. Since only constituents can move in 
natural languages, we reasoned that if learners could distinguish moved 
constituents from moved non-constituents, it must be because they had learned 
the constituent structure of the artificial language. We found that both adults, 
after 36 minutes of exposure, and 18-month-old infants, after only 2 minutes of 
exposure, were able to do so (Takahashi & Lidz 2007, Takahashi 2009). Thus, the 
statistical footprint of constituent structure is detectable by learners and is usable 
in the acquisition of phrase structure. 
 Now, the exposure provided to the learners in this experiment included 
sentences containing movement. Although the particular sentences tested were 
novel, they exhibited structures that had been evident during the initial exposure 
to the language. We thus went on to ask whether the inference that only consti-
tuents can move derives from the learner’s exposure to movement rules which 
apply only to constituents or whether this inference derives from the child’s 
antecedent knowledge about the nature of movement rules in natural language.  
 To ask this question, we created a new corpus of sentences from our artifi-
cial language. In this novel corpus we included sentences in which (i) certain con-
stituents were repeated in a sentence, (ii) certain constituents were optionally 
absent from a sentence, and (iii) certain constituents were replaced by pro-forms. 
This combination of operations created a statistical signature of the phrase struc-
ture of the language such that it was possible to identify the constituent boun-
daries in the language. However, in this input corpus we included no examples 
of movement. This made it possible for us to identify the locus of the learner’s 
knowledge that only constituents can move. If this knowledge derives from the 
learner’s experience in seeing movement rules, then we would expect learners to 
be unable to distinguish moved constituents from moved non-constituents. On 
the other hand, if the learner brings knowledge about what kinds of movement 
operations are possible in natural language to the learning task, then we would 
expect learners to correctly distinguish moved constituents from moved non-
constituents. 
 We found that both adults and 18-month-old infants displayed knowledge 
of the constraint that only constituents can move, even when their exposure to 
the artificial language contained no instances of movement whatsoever. Thus, we 
can conclude that some of what is acquired on the basis of statistical information 
is not itself reflected in the statistics. Since the learners in this experiment had 
seen no examples of movement, their knowledge of the constraint that only 
constituents can move could not have come from the exposure language but 
rather must have come from the learners themselves.  
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 In sum, identifying the constituency of a language has consequences for 
novel sentences with structures never before encountered. These deductive 
consequences reveal the structure of the learner over and above any role of 
distributional learning. Distributional learning therefore functions as part of a 
process of mapping strings onto the grammar that generated them. But some 
properties of the identified grammar are contributed by the learner’s antecedent 
knowledge of the class of possible grammars. 
 
 
4. The Deductive Consequences of (In)Definiteness: The Interpretation of 
Bare Plural Subjects 
 
It is important to recognize that this kind of argument is not limited to learning 
artificial grammars. For example, Sneed (2007) made an argument of exactly this 
form in examining children’s interpretations of indefinite NPs. She showed, first, 
that there is a distributional difference between indefinite and definite NPs that 
could be used in a process of categorizing NPs as either definite or indefinite, and 
second, that this categorization licenses inferences about interpretation that are 
not themselves supported in the input.  
 Because indefinites are generally used to introduce discourse referents and 
definites are generally used to identify existing discourse referents (Heim 1982, 
Kamp 1982), indefinites are significantly more likely to be used on the first 
mention than definites are. Similarly, because old information is more likely to 
occur earlier in a sentence than new information (Prince 1992), definites are signi-
ficantly more likely than indefinites to occur in subject position.  
 Sneed showed that there is ample evidence of these asymmetries in speech 
to children learning English so that determiners can be accurately classified as 
either definite or indefinite simply by tracking the relative likelihood of their 
occurring in first mention contexts and by tracking the relative likelihood of their 
occurring in subject position. Sneed argued (among other things) that bare 
plurals (e.g., dogs) can be classified as indefinites using this procedure. 
 As is well-known, bare plurals do occur in subject position some of the 
time (though as Sneed showed, not nearly as often as they occur in object 
position). When they do occur in subject position, they are often ambiguous 
between a generic and an existential interpretation (Diesing 1992). Consider the 
sentence in (5) and its interpretations in (6): 
 
(5) Crocodiles live in the swamp. 
 
(6) a. It is generally true of crocodiles that they live in the swamp. 
 b. There are some crocodiles that live in the swamp. 
 
In examining a corpus of child-directed speech, Sneed (2007) found that bare 
plural subjects were uniformly used generically (i.e. the interpretation (6a)) and 
were never used existentially. 
 This observation thus raises the question of whether children know that 
bare plural subjects can be used with an existential interpretation despite the fact 
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that speech to children simply does not contain examples illustrating this fact. If 
learners simply acquired the distributional features of the exposure language, 
then we would expect them to learn that bare plural subjects are obligatorily 
interpreted generically. On the other hand, if the interpretive properties of bare 
plurals follow from their meaning in concert with their syntactic position (as, for 
example, in Diesing 1992), then we might expect that once children have iden-
tified an expression as indefinite, its interpretive profile follows automatically.  
 Indeed, Sneed found that 4-year-old children were equally able to interpret 
a bare plural subject existentially and generically, despite the fact that they were 
apparently never exposed to the existential interpretation of such expressions. 
 There are two important lessons to be drawn from this work. First, while it 
is certainly true that there are statistical cues to an NPs classification as definite 
or indefinite, these cues are informative only to the extent that they are 
antecedently connected to a representation. That is, it is only because of their 
interpretive properties that indefinites are relatively less likely to occur in subject 
position than definites are. The conclusion that an expression occurring less 
likely as a subject than an object is an indefinite is valid only if the learner is 
using this asymmetry to feed a decision process about preexisting categories. The 
learner could not use this asymmetry to draw an inference about (in)definiteness 
unless this asymmetry derived from a fundamental feature of the representation 
that predicted this asymmetry to exist.  
 Second, to the degree that learners use distributional information in 
language acquisition, it must be that such information is used only when there is 
a question of how to represent a given part of the language. If learners simply 
tried to reproduce the distribution that they were exposed to, then we would not 
have found that children allow bare plural subjects to be interpreted existentially. 
In other words, learners must not be trying to determine whether bare plurals 
can be interpreted existentially. If they were, then they should have drawn the 
inference that they cannot. Rather, learners must simply be trying to classify 
nominal expressions as definite or indefinite. Any additional interpretive 
properties follow as a matter of grammar, independent of the distribution of 
these interpretations in the input.  
 Again, the deductive consequences of distributional learning reveal the 
contribution that the learner makes to language acquisition. And again, evidence 
of distributional learning is not evidence against the learner having a highly 
constrained hypothesis space. Rather, in this case, as in the previous one, 
distributional learning can be seen as feeding a selective process by which 
learners use the data to identify the grammar that generated that data (see also 
Syrett & Lidz 2009, Pearl & Lidz 2009). 
 
 
5. Selective Learning in the Acquisition of Ditransitives 
 
The inferences from surface form to grammatical representation can also be 
significantly less direct. Consider, for example, the range of ditransitive 
constructions in English, Spanish and Kannada. 
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(7) English 
 a. John sent the book to Mary. 
 b. John sent Mary the book.  
 
(8) Kannada 
 a. Hari rashmi-ge pustaka-vannu kalis-id-a. 
  Hari rashmi-DAT book-ACC    send-PST-3SM 
  ‘Hari sent a book to Rashmi.’ 
 b. Hari rashmi-ge pustaka-vannu kalis-i-koTT-a. 
  Hari rashmi-DAT book-ACC    send-PP-BEN-PST-3SM 
  ‘Hari sent a book to Rashmi.’ 
 c. Hari pustaka-vannu rashmi-ge kalis-id-a. 
  Hari book-ACC    rashmi-DAT send-PST-3SM 
  ‘Hari sent a book to Rashmi.’ 
 d. Hari pustaka-vannu rashmi-ge kalis-i-koTT-a. 
  Hari book-ACC    rashmi-DAT send-PP-BEN-PST-3SM 
  ‘Hari sent a book to Rashmi.’ 
 
(9) Spanish 
 a. Carmen envió el  libro  a su  profesora. 
  Carmen sent the  book  to her professor 
 b. Carmen le  envió el  libro  a su  profesora. 
  Carmen CL sent the  book  to her professor 
 c. Carmen envió  a su  profesora el  libro. 
  Carmen sent  to her professor  the  book 
 d. Carmen le    envió a su   profesora el  libro. 
  Carmen CL   sent  to her  professor the  book  
 
Whereas English has two surface forms for ditransitives, Kannada and Spanish 
have four. Viau & Lidz (2009), building on earlier work by Harley (2002), Bleam 
(2003), and Lidz & Williams (2005), argue that despite these surface differences, 
there is a coherent mapping of ditransitive structures across languages. In parti-
cular, languages make available two kinds of ditransitives: Those with the theme 
asymmetrically c-commanding the goal and those with the goal asymmetrically 
c-commanding the theme. In English, these correspond to the prepositional 
dative (7a) and the double object construction (7b), respectively, with word order 
functioning as a surface correlate of the syntactic structure. In Kannada and 
Spanish, however, word order is not an expression of the underlying configu-
rational structure. Rather, the structure with the theme c-commanding the goal is 
the morphologically unmarked form whereas the structure with the goal c-
commanding the theme is the morphologically marked form. In Kannada, this 
morphological form is realized through the verbal auxiliary koDu (8b,d). In 
Spanish it is realized through the dative pronominal clitic le (9b,d). 
 The argument for this way of carving up the data comes from two kinds of 
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facts. First, the goal argument functions as a kind of possessor in those configu-
rations where it is argued that the goal c-commands the theme (cf. Oehrle 1976). 
Second, patterns of binding from one argument into the other also support this 
classification. 
 The basic pattern of judgments with a quantified dative argument in shown 
in (10), where DAT indicates the indirect object, marked with dative case, ACC 
indicates the direct object, marked with accusative case, and Q- indicates which 
of these noun phrases contains a quantifier. 
 
(10) a. Q-DATx ACCx BEN 
  Rashmi pratiyobba  hudugan-ige avan-a  kudure-yannu tan-du-koTT-aLu. 
  Rashmi every    boy-DAT   3SM-GEN  horse-ACC    return-PPL-BEN.PST-3SF 
  ‘Rashmi returned every boy his horse.’ 
 b. Q-DATx ACCx unaffixed 
  Rashmi pratiyobba hudugan-ige avan-a  kudure-yannu tan-d-aLu. 
  Rashmi every   boy-DAT   3SM-GEN  horse.ACC    return-PST-3SF 
  ‘Rashmi returned every boy his horse.’ 
 c. ACCx Q-DATx BEN 
  Rashmi avan-a    kudure-yannu pratiyobba hudugan-ige  tan-du-koTT-aLu. 
  Rashmi 3SM-GEN    horse-ACC   every   boy-DAT      return-PPL-BEN.PST-3SF 
  ‘Rashmi returned his horse to every boy.’ 
 d. *ACCx Q-DATx unaffixed 
         * Rashmi avan-a    kudure-yannu pratiyobba hudugan-ige tan-d-aLu. 
  Rashmi 3SM-GEN    horse-ACC   every   boy-DAT   return-PST-3SF  
  ‘Rashmi returned his horse to every boy.’ 
 
Descriptively speaking, when the dative-marked object comes first (10a–b), it can 
bind into the accusative-marked object, whether or not the benefactive affix is 
present. In contrast, when the accusative-marked object comes first (10c–d), the 
dative can bind into it only in the presence of the benefactive affix.  
 If the quantificational phrase is the accusative argument and the prono-
minal is contained in the dative argument, however, a different pattern emerges. 
 
(11) a. *DATx Q-ACCx BEN  
         * Sampaadaka adar-a lekhan-ige pratiyondu  lekhana-vannu kaLis-i-koTT-a. 
  editor    it.GEN author.DAT every    article.ACC    send-PP-BEN.PST-3SM 
  ‘The editor sent its author every article.’ 
 b. DATx Q-ACCx unaffixed 
  Sampaadaka adar-a lekhan-ige pratiyondu  lekhana-vannu kaLis-id-a. 
  editor    it-GEN author-DAT every    article-ACC   send-PST-3SM 
  ‘The editor sent its author every article.’ 
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 c. Q-ACCx DATx BEN 
  Sampaadaka pratiyondu   lekhana-vannu adara  lekhan-ige  kaLis-i-koTT-a. 
  editor    every     article-ACC   it-GEN author-DAT  send-PP-BEN.PST-3SM 
  ‘The editor sent every article to its author’. 
 d. Q-ACCx DATx unaffixed 
  Sampaadaka pratiyondu   lekhana-vannu adar-a lekhan-ige   kaLis-id-a. 
  editor    every     article-ACC   it-GEN author-DAT   send-PST-3SM 
  ‘The editor sent every article to its author’. 
 
Here we see that when the accusative-marked object comes first (11c–d), it can 
bind into the dative-marked object, regardless of whether the benefactive affix is 
present on the verb. However, when the dative-marked object comes first (11a–
b), the accusative-marked object can bind into it only when the benefactive affix 
is absent. The relevant binding possibilities for quantified dative and accusative 
arguments are summarized below. 
 
(12) a. √ Q-DATx ACCx V-BEN  e.     * DATx Q-ACCx V-BEN 
 b. √ Q-DATx ACCx V    f.     √ DATx Q-ACCx V 
 c. √ ACCx Q-DATx V-BEN  g.     √ Q-ACCx DATx V-BEN 
 d. * ACCx Q-DATx V    h.     √ Q-ACCx DATx V 
 
 Lidz & Williams (2005) argue that the above asymmetries arise from there 
being two distinct underlying structures for ditransitives in Kannada. When the 
benefactive affix is present, the DAT–ACC order is the underlying order, with the 
ACC–DAT order derived by A-movement. Thus, according to Lidz & Williams 
(2005), (12c) is derived from (12a) by movement of the accusative argument past 
the dative. The appearance of backward binding in (12c) is due to the fact that A-
movement of the accusative over the dative does not destroy the binding relation 
established in the underlying order (12a), in which the quantified dative NP c-
commands and thereby grammatically binds into the accusative. Similarly, since 
the DAT–ACC order is underlying, a quantificational accusative-marked object 
cannot bind into the dative (12e) unless A-movement has occurred, introducing a 
new configuration to license binding (12g). 
 When there is no benefactive affix, the ACC–DAT order reflects the 
underlying structure, and the DAT–ACC order is derived by A-movement. Thus, 
(12b) is derived from (12d). The quantified dative NP in (12d) cannot bind into 
the accusative because it does not c-command the accusative; only after moving 
above the accusative, as in (12b), can it grammatically bind into the accusative. By 
the same logic, since the accusative is underlyingly higher than the dative, the 
binding of the dative by the accusative can be established over this represen-
tation (12h) and subsequent A-movement will not destroy it (12f).  
 We will assume this analysis as well as the syntactic representations that it 
entails, shown in (13) with the benefactive affix and in (14) without. Optional A-
movement is marked with a dashed arrow. 
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(13) Subject DAT ACC V-BEN 
       vP 
     4 
      subj        v’ 
       5  
      BENP         v 
     3 
     IODAT      BEN’ 
      4 
     VP      BEN 
      3 
   DOACC   V 
 
(14) Subject ACC DAT V 
       vP 
     4 
      subj        v’ 
       5  
      VP        v 
     4 
   DOACC       V’ 
          4 
       IODAT      V 
 
 The conclusion that there are two distinct underlying structures in Kan-
nada, each of which can be transformed by A-movement of the lower NP past the 
higher one straightforwardly captures the binding asymmetries discussed above.  
 The variable binding facts just presented have exact analogs in Spanish 
(Bleam 2003) with the clitic doubled ditransitives functioning exactly as the bene-
factive ditransitives in Kannada, and the morphologically unmarked ditransitives 
functioning exactly alike in the two languages. 
 In sum, so far, English, Kannada, and Spanish all utilize essentially the 
same two structures in ditransitives. In the ‘prepositional dative’, the Accusative 
argument c-commands the Dative underlyingly. This structure is expressed in 
English as the prepositional dative, in Spanish as the non-clitic-doubled ditran-
sitive, and in Kannada as the non-benefactive ditransitive. In the ‘DO-Dative’, the 
Dative argument c-commands the Accusative underlyingly. This structure is 
expressed in English as the DOC, in Spanish through dative clitic doubling, and 
in Kannada through the benefactive verbal affix. Importantly, despite this funda-
mental structural symmetry across the three languages, the surface manifestation 
of these structures is distinct in each language. DO-datives show a distinct sur-
face word order in English but not in Kannada and Spanish. Both Kannada and 
Spanish, unlike English, have a morphological distinction which correlates with 
the choice of DO-dative or prepositional dative. In Kannada, the DO-dative vari-
ant is marked by a benefactive verbal affix, while in Spanish this variant is 
marked via clitic doubling of the dative argument.  
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 Given this characterization of the facts, learners cannot rely either on the 
word order or the morphological form as evidence in determining which of the 
two abstract structures underlies a ditransitive sentence in the language they are 
learning. Neither cue is cross-linguistically reliable (Haspelmath 2005). Thus, to 
the extent that learners can be shown to identify the appropriate structure we are 
faced with an interesting puzzle. The fact that the very same structures are 
exhibited in languages with such divergent surface syntax points towards just the 
sort of cross-linguistic commonality that a selective learning theory is intended to 
explain, since the pieces of explanation are identical across languages. On the 
other hand, the fact that the surface realizations of these structures diverge across 
languages would appear to make it difficult to use the surface form as a cue for 
the underlying structure (see Hyams 1986 and Snyder 1995 for related problems 
in other syntactic domains). 
 Viau & Lidz (2009) demonstrate first that four year old learners of Kannada 
already command the variable binding facts just described, placing an upper 
bound on how much time it takes learners to acquire these facts. Moreover, it 
seems highly unlikely that learners could have acquired the full range of binding 
possibilities simply by being exposed to positive examples of the relevant sort. 
The kinds of sentences that exhibit these asymmetries are exceedingly rare. And, 
even if these sentences did occur, there is no guarantee that the learner would 
know what the intended interpretation was or whether other interpretations 
were possible but simply not yet encountered. Thus, Viau & Lidz looked for a 
more indirect source of evidence that learners could use to identify the correct re-
presentation. We argued specifically that the relevant source of evidence resides 
in the distribution of animate and inanimate goal arguments. 
 The selective learning account works as follows. The child comes to the 
learning task with the knowledge that natural languages use at least two ways to 
configure ditransitives: A possession-based structure in which the IO occurs 
higher than the DO, and a location-based structure in which the DO occurs high-
er than the IO. If the child is faced with two distinct types of ditransitive clauses 
(e.g., DO- vs. prepositional dative in English, benefactive vs. non-benefactive in 
Kannada, clitic-doubled vs. not clitic doubled in Spanish), she must then identify 
which of these to associate with which underlying configuration. To do so, the 
child relies on the distribution of animate IOs. The construction in which IOs are 
more likely to be animate than inanimate has the possession configuration, since 
inanimates are highly unlikely possessors. And the construction in which IOs are 
more likely to be inanimate than animate has the location configuration, for the 
same reason. 
 Importantly, once the learner correctly identifies the underlying 
configuration, the variable binding asymmetries that we have observed in our 
experimentation follow directly. Thus, the learner requires no experience with 
particular binding configurations in order to acquire the variable-binding asym-
metries we have observed in our experimentation.4  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
    4 This reasoning is exactly parallel to the discussion of the ‘compounding parameter’ in 
Snyder 1995. The learner can observe productive root compounding as a surface correlate of 
a particular structure from which many apparently unrelated facts follow. 
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 This is not to say, of course, that there is no learning involved in the 
acquisition of ditransitives. Our account is a learning-theoretic account in which 
the child, armed with a set of possible configurations for ditransitives and faced 
with the data, is able to use certain patterns of distribution to identify a mapping 
between surface forms and innate configurations. The innate guidance comes 
from the set of configurations and their semantic properties. Knowing these 
semantic properties enables the learner to track appropriate distributional 
information in the surface forms in order to learn which surface forms map onto 
which of the innate configurations (cf. Hyams 1986). Again, the configurations, in 
concert with basic structural requirements on variable binding and knowledge of 
how word order can be manipulated in the target language (which surely is at 
least partially learned), directly determine the binding possibilities for ditran-
sitives. 
 The critical feature of this account in the current context is that the 
asymmetry in animacy of dative arguments across constructions in a useful cue 
to the underlying structure only if the learner comes equipped with knowledge 
of the class of possible ditransitive structures. Without that knowledge, the 
asymmetry in animacy is completely uninformative about the hierarchical 
structure of the clause. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have sketched some results pointing towards an integrated theory 
of language acquisition that strongly bridges theoretical work on grammatical 
structure with developmental work on first language acquisition. It has long been 
held that the theory of language universals is equivalent to the theory of the 
language learner. This equivalence is only partial, however, since it only relates 
language universals to a specification of the initial state of the language learner. It 
is silent with respect to the algorithms that learners use to map their experience 
onto particular grammars within the space defined by universal grammar. The 
work described in the current paper shows how it is possible to find evidence 
about the structure of the learner’s initial state from developmental data 
revealing how learners use distributional, statistical facts about the language they 
experience to acquire a particular grammar. 
 In addition, the work I have described demonstrates the convergence 
between statistical approaches to language learning with traditional nativist 
approaches. The fact that learners are highly sophisticated when it comes to 
identifying statistical regularities in the environment does not by itself provide 
evidence either for or against a learning mechanism driven by innate knowledge 
of the space of possible representations. It is only when we identify the deductive 
consequences of statistical learning that we begin to see how statistical learning 
works in the service of grammatical inference. In the cases reviewed here, the 
deductive consequences of statistical learning are very rich, pointing to a highly 
articulated hypothesis space over which statistical inference can be carried out in 
language acquisition. 
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